A People Dammed
The Chixoy dam, Guatemalan Massacres and the World Bank
by Matt Pacenza.
Time after time, we find situations that illustrate the
interconnected nature of the Greens' key principles. The Chixoy Dam is
just one real-life, horrifying example.
PACUX, GUATEMALA.
Manuel and Luis would like to forget what
happened to their village of Río Negro in 1982. They are tired of the
nightmares and headaches that accompany their memories. But the first
sight that greets them each morning when they leave their huts--the
shimmering waters of the Chixoy Reservoir--brings it all flooding back.
For Luis, Manuel and other survivors of the 1982 Río Negro
massacres, the waters of the Chixoy [chee-SHOY] do not represent the
"progress" --cheap, bountiful and sustainable electricity--that World Bank
and Guatemalan authorities promised them. Rather, they remember the
destruction of family, land and livelihood that the project brought them.
Water is not the only substance that they see each morning, for, in their
eyes, "the Chixoy reservoir was built with the blood of our people."
The blood flowed heaviest on March 13, 1982. "I lost more than 80
family members that day," Luis says. "I had a large family--many aunts,
uncles, brothers, sisters, cousins, nieces and nephews. So many were
killed. Today we are few."
Manuel was an eyewitness to that massacre. The Guatemalan Armed
Forces and local civil defense patrol units forced him and nearly 200 Río
Negro women and children to gather together outside their homes in
north-central Guatemala. Telling them that they were being brought to a
"meeting," soldiers marched them several hours up a steep hill above their
riverside community until they arrived at a place known as Pacoxom.
"There they began to rape the women, and to kill," remembers
Manuel.
"They killed them in so many ways," Luís interjects. He watched
the violence from a hiding place on a nearby hill. "Some were shot,
others had their throats slit with a machete. Some were strangled, or
beaten with rocks and rifle butts. They killed the children by smashing
their heads against the rocks. Because their skulls were so tender, they
died instantly."
Manuel says softly, "That's how one of the civil patrollers killed
my younger brother. I was running after him, and watched him pick my
brother up by the ankles and smash his head into a rock."
In total, the patrollers and soldiers killed 178 people in Rio
Negro on March 13, 1982: 70 women, 107 children and an old man who was
forced into a canvas sack and thrown off a cliff. In a series of
massacres later that year, they killed hundreds more in Río Negro and
neighboring villages.
"What happened to Río Negro in 1982 was so unjust," Luís says, "but
we were not innocent. We had committed many crimes: the crime of being
indigenous, the crime of being Catholic, and most importantly the crime of
being united, of working together to fight that cursed dam."
The "cursed dam" was part of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Project, a
massive dam, reservoir and power station built by the Guatemala state
electricity company (INDE) with funding and technical support from the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. The village of Río Negro
stood in the path of the project.
Development dream or nightmare?
The World Bank counseled Guatemala that the Chixoy project would
bring the poor Central American nation cheap, sustainable power. Soon
after Guatemalan authorities announced their plans to build this
"development dream," the World Bank promised $72 million and the IDB $105
million, although adequate feasibility and social and environmental impact
studies had not been conducted.
One example of the planning flaws that characterized the Chixoy
project: neither INDE nor the World Bank consulted the people that lived
along the river to be flooded in the Chixoy dam. Almost two years after
project construction began, in 1977, INDE officials flew by helicopter
into the village of Río Negro to inform residents that they would need to
abandon their homelands.
These Maya Achí people had maintained a rich cultural heritage
along the fertile banks of the Río Chixoy for hundreds of years. "Life
was hard, but it was good," one elder remembers. "People were content.
Everyone lived nearby, we all knew each other, and we lived peacefully."
Río Negro villagers were angered by the abrupt announcement that
they would soon need to leave their land. "Many people did not want to
leave and stood up for their rights," Luis remembers. He was a leader of
a committee chosen by the community to negotiate with INDE. The people of
Río Negro drew upon a long history of collective organization--community
work, education and health projects promoted primarily by the Catholic
Church--to support their struggle with INDE.
INDE and the Río Negro committee reached an agreement on a
resettlement package in 1980. However, when the people of Río Negro saw
the rocky, marginal land that was supposed to sustain them in their new
lives--the farm of Pacux--they refused to leave Río Negro unless they were
provided with basic resources needed--fertile land and water--to rebuild
their lives.
Luís recalls how INDE responded, "They told us, 'If you don't
leave, we'll send the army to drive you out with bullets.' And that's what
happened."
Violence first struck on March 4, 1980, when three INDE security
officials arrived in the community to arrest several community members for
stealing from a local store. "We told the soldiers to leave," one
resident recalls. "They began shooting, killing seven of us, and then
they attempted to flee. One escaped, the second we caught and later
released and the third drowned in the river. For this, we were accused of
murder."
In July 1980, two Río Negro committee members went to meet with
INDE officials at the dam site. They were carrying the community's only
records of the resettlement and cash payment agreements that had been
reached with INDE. Both men "disappeared." Their heavily tortured bodies
were found a week later. The records were never recovered.
These acts of violence terrorized the people of Río Negro, and
peaceful efforts at negotiation broke down. Stubbornly, they remained on
their land, hoping that a miracle would allow them to stay. Project
construction continued and, by the start of 1982, was nearing completion.
The people of Río Negro were in the way, and that year they paid the
price.
The 1982 massacres
The first massacre suffered by Río Negro was on February 13, 1982.
A local military commander ordered 74 men and women from Río Negro to
report to the nearby village of Xococ [show-COKE] for weapons training.
Upon arrival, they were tortured, raped and murdered by the Xococ civil
defense patrol, an involuntary civilian wing of the military employed to
terrorize neighboring villages. One woman escaped, walked all night and
arrived in Río Negro the next day.
"She told us what had happened--that our loved ones had been
killed. Children were crying, asking for their parents. We were
terrified," Luís remembers.
Exactly one month after the Xococ massacre, the civil defense
patrollers and Guatemalan soldiers arrived in Río Negro. The men of the
village were not present that day, because they had taken to the hills to
hide. The women refused to go, fearing they and their children could not
survive, "living like animals in the mountains." One survivor recalls,
"They thought it was only the men that the patrollers from Xococ wanted.
That's what we all thought."
Witnesses to the massacre recount that the soldiers told the 177
women and children before they were killed that they were being punished
for being "guerrillas." The World Bank backs this interpretation in
several of its Chixoy documents, referring to "insurgency activity in the
project area" as the cause of "resettlement problems."
A survivor of the massacre responds, "How can innocent women and
children, many of them pregnant, be mistaken for guerrillas? They
couldn't be. None of us were. We were peasants trying to make a living
from the soil like our parents and our ancestors. I'll tell you the real
reason for the violence: they wanted our land for their cursed reservoir
and dam, and we were in the way."
Terrified, survivors of the February and March massacres abandoned
Río Negro and hid nearby. One group of 84 Río Negro refugees was
discovered and killed by soldiers and patrollers at Los Encuentros, five
miles from Río Negro, on May 14, 1982. Witnesses who worked at the nearby
dam site in Pueblo Viejo assert that several hours prior to the massacre,
soldiers stopped at the INDE office there, borrowed an INDE truck and
drove to Los Encuentros to commit the massacre. After they had finished
in Los Encuentros, the soldiers proceeded to Río Negro, burning the
abandoned village to the ground.
Four months later, on September 13, civil defense patrollers and
soldiers killed 92 people in Agua Fria, another village near the dam site.
The soldiers forced the victims into a community house, barred the door
and machine gunned the house. When all were killed, the house was burned
to the ground. Thirty-five of those killed were orphaned children from
Río Negro, whom the people of Agua Fria had taken into their homes.
In total, 369 Río Negro villagers were murdered in 1982.
Survivors fled, and their village was destroyed. No one remained "in the
way." The Chixoy Reservoir began to be filled in late 1982, and what
remained of Río Negro was soon underwater.
The World Bank and the massacres
The World Bank was not only involved closely with INDE and the
Chixoy Project prior to the violence, but granted an additional $44.6
million loan three years later, in 1985. The Bank documents approving the
1985 loan make almost no mention of the massacres associated with the
Chixoy.
The April publication of a Witness for Peace report on the Chixoy
Project violence has prompted public questioning of the Bank's role. What
did Bank officials know about the massacre? And why did they continue to
fund and support the project in 1985?
World Bank President James Wolfensohn responded to these questions
on June 18. In a letter to Witness for Peace and the International Rivers
Network, Wolfensohn wrote that a preliminary investigation had found "no
indication that the Bank staff had any information . . . that Río Negro
had been attacked in order to clear the way for the reservoir."
Guatemalan sources question the veracity of this claim. As one
construction worker who was employed at the dam site from 1977 to 1982
says, "Everybody know about the corruption and the violence." Guatemalans
did not speak out, he says, because "we were all too terrified to say
anything."
A Guatemalan journalist who investigated the issue adds, "The
whole area was under siege. One of the heads of security at the project
was responsible for orchestrating much of the bloodshed. His brother was
a high ranking army official in the region at the time. There's no doubt
that the INDE encouraged--and benefited from--the massacres." World Bank
personnel worked in supervisory capacities with INDE officials at the
Chixoy site regularly from 1979 to 1991. Bank documents even indicate
that in 1984, the Bank hired "an expert on resettlement policy to assist
in the [resettlement] supervision function."
One Bank official told Inter Press Service on condition of
anonymity that the Bank did indeed know about the massacres as they were
occurring, but claimed, "There was nothing we could do about it."
The survivors today
Luís remembers his life after the terror of 1982: "We were forced
to seek refuge wherever we could. We hid in the weeds and brush near the
place where our village was destroyed. We couldn't cook, because if we
lit a fire they would find us. We couldn't plant corn, because they would
find our fields. So we ate whatever little thing we could find: roots,
grass and raw fish. Some days we ate nothing. I, and 23 other people,
lived that way for five years."
Survivors of the Río Negro massacres assert that their life has
improved little today. Most of them live in Pacux, the farm that INDE
purchased for them as compensation for the lands they lost in Río Negro.
The rocky, bare soil in Pacux discourages planting, employment is limited
and families struggle daily to earn enough cash to buy food. "We are like
a tree that was violently uprooted and then hastily replanted in another
place," Manuel says. "It is very difficult for that tree to grow again."
While Wolfensohn's June 18 letter recognizes that the Chixoy
Project resettlement planning was "totally inadequate," it also asserts
the Bank has since taken "corrective actions" in an "improved resettlement
program."
The survivors of the massacres dispute this claim, and detail the
many agreements that INDE has failed to fulfill: adequate and fertile
land, titles to houses and land, a potable water supply, and cash payments
for lost crops.
A local Catholic priest sees these broken promises as a
continuation of the violence for the people of Río Negro. "For more than
15 years, the people have suffered, far from their community, far from the
land that has given them food, without the bare necessities of life."
The economic track record of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Project
demonstrates the breadth of its failure. The project has never produced
more than 70 percent of capacity. Cost overruns inflated the price tag
from $270 million to $1.2 billion. And, because of a failure to conduct
studies which would have predicted that the erosion of the Chixoy Basin's
badly denuded hillsides would result in reservoir siltation that will soon
shut down the power turbines, recent estimates predict that the Chixoy
will cease to produce electricity in 20 years, far sooner than the
200-year project life the World Bank estimated.
Such clear indications have forced INDE and the World Bank to
admit the project was a bad idea. In 1987, an INDE president described
the Chixoy as "a financial disaster . . . which never should have been
built." The World Bank in 1991 stated that the Chixoy "had proved to be
an unwise and uneconomic investment" and Wolfensohn in his June 18 letter
acknowledges that "this was a very weak project on technical and economic
grounds."
A fight for the future
The World Bank's public response to the recent questioning of its
support of the disastrous Chixoy Hydroelectric Project has been that it
has turned over a new leaf. Wolfensohn wrote on June 18 that the
"emphasis now needs to be on the future."
Luís and Manuel of Río Negro agree. Each day they focus on the
future, as they struggle to determine how they can provide for their
families. However, they also continue to remember the past, through the
violent nightmares that haunt their nights as well as through the many
ways in which the project has shattered their dreams and make day-to-day
survival a challenge.
Luís want the World Bank to know about their continued suffering,
and asks "that they find a solution, an immediate solution, because it
happened over 10 years ago, and all that was promised hasn't been
fulfilled. . . . We from Río Negro continue to suffer."
Reprinted from pages 8-11 of the July/August 1996 issue of
Multinational Monitor, which permits reproduction for non-commercial use
with proper credit to the Monitor.
Matt Pacenza recently completed two years of work in Guatemala
with Witness for Peace, a faith-based human rights organization. This
story draws in large part on a report that he co-authored, "A People
Dammed," released by Witness for Peace in April. Names used in this
article are pseudonyms, given to protect Guatemalans often the target of
violence for their efforts to tell the truth.